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Abstract
■ Surprising events may be relevant or irrelevant for behavior,
requiring either flexible adjustment or stabilization of our model
of the world and according response strategies. Cognitive flexi-
bility and stability in response to environmental demands have
been described as separable cognitive states, associated with
activity of striatal and lateral prefrontal regions, respectively. It
so far remains unclear, however, whether these two states act
in an antagonistic fashion and which neural mechanisms medi-
ate the selection of respective responses, on the one hand, and a
transition between these states, on the other. In this study, we
tested whether the functional dichotomy between striatal and
prefrontal activity applies for the separate functions of updating
(in response to changes in the environment, i.e., switches) and
shielding (in response to chance occurrences of events violating
expectations, i.e., drifts) of current predictions. We measured
brain activity using fMRI while 20 healthy participants performed
a task that required to serially predict upcoming items. Switches
between predictable sequences had to be indicated via button
press while sequence omissions (drifts) had to be ignored. We
further varied the probability of switches and drifts to assess the
neural network supporting the transition between flexible and
stable cognitive states as a function of recent performance his-
tory in response to environmental demands. Flexible switching
between models was associated with activation in medial pFC
(BA 9 and BA 10), whereas stable maintenance of the internal
model corresponded to activation in the lateral pFC (BA 6 and
inferior frontal gyrus). Our findings extend previous studies on
the interplay of flexibility and stability, suggesting that different
prefrontal regions are activated by different types of prediction
errors, dependent on their behavioral requirements. Further-
more, we found that striatal activation in response to switches
and drifts was modulated by participants’ successful behavior to-
ward these events, suggesting the striatum to be responsible for
response selections following unpredicted stimuli. Finally, we
observed that the dopaminergic midbrain modulates the transi-
tion between different cognitive states, thresholded by partici-
pants’ individual performance history in response to temporal
environmental demands. ■
INTRODUCTION
From changing our way to work when we learn about
the opening of a new ring road to sticking to the usual
route despite heavy traffic, we constantly rely on balanc-
ing between the adaptation of expectations to persistent
changes and the maintenance of successful strategies de-
spite temporary distraction.
In sensory processing, this interplay between flexibility
and stability is explained by a fundamental characteristic
of brain function: Perception is an inherently predictive
process, which relies on the comparison between pre-
dicted and actual sensory input (for a review, see Clark,
2013). Predicted input contains little information beyond
the confirmation of our internal model of the world and
therefore receives little attention. Improbable input, in
contrast, violates predictions and is informative as it
may require flexible adaptation of the internal model.
However, violations of prediction could either signal
the need for adapting to lasting changes of the environ-
ment, that is, switches, or be caused by temporary
chance occurrences of uncommon events (drifts, here-
after). Experiencing violations of predictions may there-
fore either require flexible updating or stabilization of
current predictions. This delicate balance in response
selection has been suggested to depend on optimal dopa-
mine (DA) levels in frontostriatal circuits: Whereas DA in
the lateral pFC is essential for stabilizing working memory
representations, DA in the striatum has been associated
with flexible updating of working memory (for a review,
see Cools & D’Esposito, 2011). However, the specific
mechanisms and functional anatomy of stimulus selection
and processing of relevant and irrelevant prediction errors
to date remain poorly understood.
Recent work suggests that phasic DA release in the
dopaminergic midbrain, that is, the substantia nigra (SN)
and ventral tegmental area, is triggered in response to
salient, unpredicted external stimuli independent of asso-
ciated reward (Schiffer, Waszak, & Yeung, 2015; Redgrave
& Gurney, 2006; Schultz & Dickinson, 2000) and thus
constitutes a global teaching signal (D’Esposito & Postle,
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2015). In contrast, DA receptor activation in the stria-
tum, one of the main target structures of SN and ventral
tegmental area projections, has been linked to flexible
updating of relevant information in working memory
(e.g., D’Ardenne et al., 2012; Cools, Sheridan, Jacobs, &
D’Esposito, 2007; Bilder, Volavka, Lachman, & Grace,
2004; Frank, Loughry, & O’Reilly, 2001). This has been de-
scribed as a selective gating process (Chatham & Badre,
2015; Badre, 2012), in which input gating of the striatum
ensures that behaviorally relevant information enters
cortical working memory. The first questions of this study
therefore is whether striatal activity relates exclusively to
flexible updating driven by relevant changes or rather
reflects the processing of unpredicted sensory information
in general.
Beyond this moment-by-moment perspective, the
volatility, that is, the rate of change in the environment,
plays a role in regulating the interplay between flexible
and stable states. Temporary extended increases in pre-
diction errors indicate volatile environments and lead to
a fast adjustment of internal predictions and behavior
( Jiang, Beck, Heller, & Egner, 2015; Chumbley et al.,
2014; Schiffer, Ahlheim, Wurm, & Schubotz, 2012; Friston,
Daunizeau, & Kiebel, 2009; Behrens, Woolrich, Walton, &
Rushworth, 2007). Recent studies provide evidence that
longer timescale tonic DA modulates the extent to which
prior action outcome biases phasic DA release and hence
future action selection (Yu, FitzGerald, & Friston, 2013;
Humphries, Khamassi, & Gurney, 2012; Beeler, Daw,
Frazier, & Zhuang, 2010). This idea has been formalized
in the dual-state theory of working memory, according to
which representations in pFC are regulated by so-called
attractor networks (Durstewitz & Seamans, 2008; Durstewitz,
Seamans, & Sejnowski, 2000). These can assume either
high- or low-energy barriers, corresponding to a shielding
or a destabilization of current working memory repre-
sentations, respectively. The adjustment of each of the
two states relies on tonic DA release in the dopaminergic
midbrain, driven by the interplay of previous event pre-
dictability and the history of behavioral outcomes. This
leads to the hypothesis that the failure to flexibly adapt in
volatile environments would lead to increased DA levels
thereby promoting transition into a flexible cognitive
state. Conversely, the failure to ignore drifts and to main-
tain stable responding in stable environments should be
accompanied by decreased DA activity, thereby promot-
ing transition into a more stable state. Whereas the first
question of this study thus pertains to the immediate re-
sponse to different types of prediction errors (i.e., flexible
switching or stable maintenance), the second question is
whether these responses are modulated by cognitive
states pertaining to recent performance history resulting
from different levels of volatility.
We employed fMRI while participants performed a task
that required monitoring of a digit sequence for structure-
violating items. Switches between predictable sequences
had to be indicated via button press (cognitive flexibility),
whereas sequence omissions (drifts) had to be ignored
(cognitive stability). Switch and drift probabilities varied
across the experiment. Implementing switches and drifts
in the same design allowed us to use correlational analysis
on the rate of correctly detected switches and ignored
drifts to show that cognitive flexibility and stability are
functionally independent (Cools & D’Esposito, 2011).
This way, we could further test our hypothesis that model
updating and stabilization as functionally independent
processes would recruit different cortical regions: Model
update and retrieval from episodic memory was expected
to be reflected in activity of medial prefrontal areas and
the hippocampus (Schlichting & Preston, 2015; Preston
& Eichenbaum, 2013). In contrast, stabilization of pre-
diction was hypothesized to be accompanied by premotor
and lateral pFC activation (Cohen, Braver, & Brown, 2002;
Miller & Cohen, 2001), whereby either dorsal or ventral
activation would reflect the way a model content is stored
in working memory, that is, spatially or verbally, respec-
tively (Rottschy et al., 2012). With regard to the role of
the striatum in immediate response selection, we hypoth-
esized caudate activity in response to both switches and
drifts (Schiffer et al., 2012). Crucially, we expected the
degree of activation increase to be correlated with the
ability to discriminate between both events, showing
that the striatum is related to selecting correct responses
toward different types of prediction errors (Chatham &
Badre, 2015; Badre, 2012). Finally, to test the idea that
the dopaminergic midbrain is involved in the transition be-
tween cognitive states (Humphries et al., 2012; Durstewitz
& Seamans, 2008), we measured adaptation of flexible
and stable states as determined by previous performance
within time windows that were individually fitted by levels
of volatility predicting participants’ behavioral data.
METHODS
Participants
Twenty-two right-handed healthy participants (16 women;
23.26 ± 2.19 years old, range = 19–27 years) with normal
or corrected-to-normal vision participated in the study.
None of them reported a history of medical, neurological,
or psychiatric disorders or substance abuse. The study
protocol was conducted in accordance with ethical stan-
dards of the Declaration of Helsinki and approved by
the local ethics committee of the University of Münster.
Each participant submitted a signed informed consent
notification and received reimbursement or course credits
for their participation afterwards. For further assessment,
participants were given the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale
(BIS-11; Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995). Two par-
ticipants were excluded (because of pressing the wrong
response button and an incidental finding of brain ab-
normality). Thus, a total of 20 participants (15 women;
23.57 ± 2.60 years old, range = 19–27) were included
in the analysis.
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Task
Participants were presented with two different digit se-
quences, which allowed them to generate an internal
model predicting forthcoming input (ascending model:
1–2–3–4, descending model: 4–3–2–1). Digits continu-
ously followed one another and were presented on the
screen for 900 msec, separated by an ISI of 100 msec
(Figure 1). Sequences repeated constantly to enable
the participants to predict the regular sequence. Occa-
sionally, switches between the models, that is, directional
changes, occurred at a random position within the cur-
rent sequence. In addition, single digits were omitted
sometimes at variable positions without experiencing a
temporal gap (drifts, hereafter). Derived from signal de-
tection theory measures, the participant’s task was to in-
dicate a switch from one model to the other by button
press (switch detection) but to ignore the sequential
omissions (drift rejection). They had to respond as fast
and accurately as possible and received individual per-
formance feedback in three breaks of 14 sec every four
blocks.
The task consisted of 12 blocks with an average number
of 160 trials (SD = 6.82) in a full-factorial 2 (Probability:
high vs. low) × 2 (Event: switch vs. drift) design. This
means that blocks either had a high or low probability of
switches, paired with a high or low probability of drifts.
Transitions between block types resulting from factor
combination were balanced across the entire session.
Event probabilities were individually staircased before
the scanner session and probabilities for switches and
drifts always adapted to the same extent. Here, partici-
pants performed 10 blocks with 80 trials each, starting
with an event frequency of 17.5%. For a block perfor-
mance higher (lower) than 75%, event frequency increased
(decreased) with a rate of 2.5% in the subsequent block.
The maximum reached frequency of events across the
entire staircase session (M = 24.5%, SD = 1.7) served as
maximum event frequency in unmixed blocks of the main
experiment, in which switches and drifts occurred with the
same frequency. Minimum event frequency was set to
approximately one third of the respective individual maxi-
mum frequency. In mixed (i.e., high-switch and low-drift or
vice versa) blocks, the difference between maximum fre-
quency for both event types and minimum frequency for
one event type served as maximum event frequency,
whereas minimum frequency remained equal. In this
way, difficulty level in terms of overall probability of events
was kept constant across the experiment (with the ex-
ception of unmixed low-frequency blocks).
Stimulus presentation per block was pseudorandomized
by using the stochastic universal sampling method (Baker,
1987). This method ensured a balanced distribution of
event types across the block so that the observed event
frequencies were in line with the expected frequencies.
fMRI Data Acquisition
Whole-brain imaging data were collected on a 3-T Siemens
Magnetom Prisma MR tomograph (Siemens, Erlangen,
Germany) using a 20-channel head coil. To minimize head
motion, the head was tightly fixated with cushions. Func-
tional images were acquired using a gradient T2*-weight-
ed single-shot EPI sequence sensitive to BOLD contrast
(64 × 64 data acquisition matrix, 192 mm field of view,
90° flip angle, repetition time = 2000 msec, echo time =
30 msec). Each volume consisted of 30 adjacent axial slices
with a slice thickness of 4 mm and a gap of 1 mm, resulting
in a voxel size of 3 × 3 × 5 mm. Images were acquired in
ascending order along the AC–PC plane to provide a
whole-brain coverage. Structural data were acquired for
each participant using a standard Siemens 3-D T1-weighted
MPRAGE sequence for detailed reconstruction of anatomy
with isotropic voxels (1 × 1 × 1 mm) in a 256-mm field of
view (256 × 256 matrix, 192 slices, repetition time = 2130,
echo time = 2.28). Stimuli were projected on a screen that
was positionedbehind theparticipant’s head. Theywerepre-
sented in the center of the field of vision by a video projector,
andparticipants viewed the screenby a 45°mirror,whichwas
fixated on the top of the head coil and adjusted for each
participant to provide a good view of the entire screen.
Behavioral Data Analysis
Performance on the task was defined by hits (correct
detection of switches), correct rejections of drifts, and,
correspondingly, switch misses and false alarms at drifts.
Discrimination index (Pr; probability of recognition of
switches and drifts, i.e., (hits + 0.5/number of switches + 1)−
(false alarms + 0.5/number of drifts + 1)) and bias index
(Br; response probability in an uncertain state, i.e., (false
alarms + 0.5/number of drifts + 1)/(1 − Pr)) were calcu-
lated (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988). Hit and correct rejection
rate and RTs at hits and false alarms were compared by
Student’s paired t tests. To assess the relationship be-
tween hits and correct rejections, we calculated Pearson’s
correlation coefficient. To show that there was no relation-
ship between the two measures, we additionally calculated
Figure 1. Schematic diagram of the task. Stimuli of a simple four-digit
sequence continuously followed each other with a frequency of 1 Hz.
Participants had to indicate a change in the direction of a sequence
(switch), as displayed in the upper row, via button press. At the same
time, they had to ignore the omission of a single digit (drift), as
displayed in the lower row. The probability of occurrence of each
respective type of sequence violation changed from block to block.
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the attenuation adjusted correlation coefficient, which
provides an estimate of the strength of a correlation assum-
ing no measurement error. For this purpose, the correla-
tion of the two variables (rxy) was divided by the square
root of their multiplied reliabilities (rxx and ryy; see
Spearman, 1904). Here, we calculated split-half reliability,
that is, Pearson’s correlation coefficients between scores
of the two halves of the test for both switch detection and
drift rejection. If not stated otherwise, significance tests
were performed at α = .05, two-sided.
fMRI Data Analysis
fMRI Data Preprocessing
Brain image preprocessing and basic statistical analyses
were conducted using LIPSIA software package, version
3.0 (Lohmann et al., 2001). As a first step, spikes in time
series were corrected by interpolating them with adjacent
time points. To correct for temporal offsets between the
slices acquired in one scan, a cubic-spline interpolation
was used. Additionally, individual functional magnetic res-
onance (EPI) images were motion-corrected with the first
time-step as reference and six degrees of freedom (three
rotational, three translational). Then, the average across
all time points of this corrected data was used as reference
scan for a second pass of motion correction. Motion cor-
rection estimates were inspected visually. A rigid linear
registration with six degrees of freedom (three rotational,
three translational) was performed to align the functional
data slices with a 3-D stereotactic coordinate reference
system. Rotational and translational parameters were
acquired by coregistration of the first EPI magnetic reso-
nance time step to the individual 3-D MPRAGE reference
set. Anatomical datasets were normalized to the ICBM/
MNI space by linear scaling. The resulting parameters
were then used to transform all functional slices employ-
ing a trilinear interpolation. Resulting data had a spatial
resolution of 3 × 3 × 3 mm (27 mm3). Normalized func-
tional images were spatially smoothed with a Gaussian
kernel of 6 mm FWHM. A temporal high-pass filter of
1/128 HZ was applied to the data to remove low-frequency
noise such as scanner drift. To prevent effects of physio-
logical noise in the midbrain (e.g., pulsation artifacts), the
component-based noise correction method (CompCor)
was applied to the epoch-related analysis (see below) to
reduce the temporal standard deviation of the BOLD sig-
nal (Behzadi, Restom, Liau, & Liu, 2007). During this
application, the first few principal components of regions
with high temporal variance are obtained and factored out
via linear regression.
Design Specification
Statistical analysis was based on a least squares estimation
using the general linear model (GLM) for serially auto-
correlated observations (Friston et al., 1995; Worsley &
Friston, 1995). Event- and epoch-related analyses were con-
ducted in separated GLMs: The event-related analysis fo-
cused on BOLD signal changes during single trials to assess
prediction error processing, whereas the epoch-related
analysis included entire periodswhere either unstable or in-
flexible states were adjusted. Single trials and epochs were
modeled as delta and box-car functions, respectively, and
convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response func-
tion. In both models, the subject-specific six rigid body
transformations obtained from residual motion correction
were included as further covariates of no interest.
Flexible and stable responses to prediction errors. To
analyze common and differential neural signatures of re-
sponses to both types of prediction errors, that is, switches
and drifts, we calculated first-level regression models
containing the specific events with an amplitude of one,
that is, standard digits (STD), switches (SW), drifts (DR),
and breaks of 14 sec. Only correct responses were ana-
lyzed, which comprised the full duration of the presented
trial (1 sec). Because of the high event density, only events
at a distance of at least two trials to the next modeled event
were included. Furthermore, the GLM contained a sepa-
rate regressor subsuming all button presses, that is, hits
and false alarms. This controlled for motor response activ-
ity during switch versus drift processing inasmuch as only
the first event type required a motor response whereas
the second did not. This way, the switch effect, which
would otherwise have concealed the drift effect, could be
leveled. To provide further verification for the existence
of the two networks, we calculated an additional GLM con-
taining the specific error types, that is, switch misses and
false alarms at drifts, which were contrasted with hits and
correct rejections, respectively (for a detailed analysis,
see Supplementary Material; https//figshare.com/s/
e0bfd1e93bf80e57f6f0). Contrast images, that is, beta
value estimates of the raw score differences between
specified conditions, were generated for each participant.
Thresholds for flexible and stable state transitions driven
by recent performance history. We expected midbrain
dopaminergic activity to correspond to the experience-
driven transitions to flexible and stable states. We there-
fore conducted an epoch-related analysis to assess neural
activity emerging from performance history in response
to different switch and drift probabilities in the recent past
within an individually fitted time window. To estimate the
participant-specific length of the time window, across
which switch and drift probability were accumulated,
logistic regressions were conducted for each subject.
The regression model estimated the degree to which win-
dow length-based Shannon’s surprise I(xi) for switches
and drifts (Shannon, 1948) could predict (variance in) re-
sponse accuracy for both types of events (hits and correct
rejections).
Shannon’s surprise can be used as a measure of antici-
pation success because it is based on the frequency of an
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event p(xi) normalized by the sum of all event types over
a defined window of recent events (see Equation 1).
Calculation of event probability:
p xið Þ ¼ n xið Þ þ 1X
xt þ 1
(1)
The surprise I(xi) of each event given by the negative
logarithm of this probability quantifies the amount of in-
formation provided by the current stimulus dependent on
the history of previous stimuli (see Equation 2).
Calculation of Shannon’s surprise:
I xið Þ ¼ − ln p xið Þ (2)
We conducted these regressions for sliding windows
with a minimum length of 20 trials and a trial-wise in-
crease up to themean predefined block length of 160 trials.
Subsequently, the respective window length that pro-
vided the minimum deviance, that is, the difference be-
tween the log-likelihood of the fitted model and the
maximum possible likelihood, was chosen as subject-
specific epoch duration in the fMRI analysis. A paired t test
between these individually obtained deviance values and
deviances of models determining surprise as a function
of mean block length of 160 trials was calculated. This
was done to validate the significance of fit improvement
by the individual sliding window length.
On the basis of the derived window length, we then
calculated the difference of error type per window (num-
ber of misses − number of false alarms) to reflect the
bias of prior performance. High values correspond to rare
responding, resulting in a high miss as well as a high cor-
rect rejection rate. In contrast, low values reflect a bias
toward frequent responses resulting in a higher hit, but
also higher false alarm rate. The GLM underlying the fMRI
analysis included the parametric effect of this bias on
neural activity within the respective subsequent period
as the main regressor of interest. We included mean sur-
prise at switches and at drifts per window as nuisance
regressors in the GLM. This ensured that the effects of
the previous error bias on activity within a current period
could not be attributed to the probability of critical events
within this period.
Group Analysis
To obtain group statistics, the resulting contrast images of
all participants were entered into a second-level random-
effects analysis using a one-sample t test across partici-
pants to test for significant deviation from zero. To assess
differences between switch and drift processing, hits at
switches were contrasted with drift rejections (SW >
DR) and vice versa (DR > SW) in the GLM, which con-
trolled for motor responses. Furthermore, we calculated
the block-wise parametric effects for the error bias (BIAS).
We corrected for multiple comparisons across all voxels
using the threshold-free cluster enhancement (TFCE)
method (Smith & Nichols, 2009). The significance level
for whole-brain activations was set to p < .05 TFCE-
corrected. Default TFCE parameters H = 2 and E = 0.5
were used.
ROI Analysis
To test for a specific role of the caudate nucleus in global
prediction error processing, we assessed overlapping effects
of switch- and drift-elicited activity using small volume cor-
rection (SVC) on the additive conjunction analysis [(SW >
STD) ∩ (DR > STD)] at p < .05 TFCE-SVC-corrected.
Anatomical masks of left and right caudate were defined
based on the Automated Anatomical Labeling (AAL) atlas
(Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002). Beta values of these ROIs,
that is, left and right caudate, were extracted and correlated
with Pr index. Alpha level was Bonferroni-corrected.
To investigate effects of error bias on dopaminergic
midbrain activity, left and right SN ROIs were used for
SVC. These ROIs were derived from the probabilistic atlas
of the BG (ATAG; Keuken et al., 2014).
RESULTS
Behavioral Results
To assess participants’ performance and response ten-
dency on the task, we used signal detection theory mea-
sures mean discrimination index (Pr) and bias index (Br;
Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988). Mean Pr index was M = 0.78
(SD = 0.14), and mean Br index was M = 0.35 (SD =
0.27). This bias toward conservative response thresholds
across the whole group also translated into a significant
difference between hits at switches M = 84.31% (SD =
12.60) and correct rejections at drifts (M = 94.26%, SD =
5.73), t(19)= 3.243, p= .004.Mean RT at hits (M=953msec,
SD = 177) did not differ significantly from mean RT at
false alarms (M = 890 msec, SD = 186), t(19) = 1.569, p =
.133. As we expected the Br value to reflect trait impul-
sivity of the participants, we conducted a correlational
analysis on Br score with BIS-11 total score that, however,
did not reveal a significant association (r = .15, p = .36).
To test our hypothesis that cognitive flexibility and
cognitive stability would be functionally independent, we
performed a correlation analysis between the rate of hits
(detected switches) and the rate of correct rejections
(ignored drifts). This analysis revealed no significant rela-
tionship between the two variables (r = .025, a(r) = 0.16,
p= .918; Figure 2A), despite attenuation correction.
Individual drift and switch surprise rates were modeled
on the basis of an individually fitted window of recent
events for each subject. Mean trial number of the sliding
window was M = 40.76 (SD = 36.81). The individually
optimized logistic regressions fitted the data significantly
better than those that were based on the mean block
length of 160 trials (t(19) = 7.31, p < .001). Although par-
ticipants showed an anticipation effect of drift processing,
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participants did not adapt to environments with a high
amount of switches: High surprise of drifts was related to
a high chance of making an error, whereas high switch sur-
prise was accompanied by lower error chance (Figure 2B).
Imaging Results
To assess differential cortical processing of switches and
drifts, we contrasted BOLD signal changes between suc-
cessfully detected switches and successfully rejected
drifts and vice versa. We expected to find medial pFC
(MPFC) and hippocampus in response to switches as a
sign of updating predictions from long-term memory.
In contrast, we hypothesized drift-specific activation in
lateral prefrontal and premotor regions reflecting height-
ened demands on model stabilization.
Differential Cortical Networks for Flexible and
Stable Responses
The switch-specific contrast estimate (SW > DR) re-
vealed prefrontal activation of bilateral MPFC, including
BA 9 and BA 10, extending into dorsal ACC, as well as
of the right hippocampus (Figure 3A). The reverse con-
trast, that is, successful rejection of drifts (DR > SW),
yielded BOLD signal changes in bilateral SMA and pre-
motor cortex, portions of the triangular and opercular
parts of the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), and anterior
insula (Figure 3B; Table 1). Results of an alternative GLM
excluding motor responses as regressor of no interest
and of the GLM, in which error types were contrasted with
correct responses, are included in the Supplementary
Material.
Striatal Activity toward Prediction Errors Associated
with Task Performance
To assess BOLD signal changes during the processing of
prediction errors, an additive conjunction of the con-
trasts switch versus standard digit and drift versus stan-
dard digit (SW > STD) ∩ (DR > STD) was computed.
This contrast revealed the expected caudate nucleus
activation at a threshold of p < .05, TFCE-corrected (R:
x = 8, y = 18, z = −2; L: x = −10, y = 18, z = −2).
Figure 2. (A) Scatter plot of
nonsignificant correlation
between performance on
switches and drifts, measured
as percent correct responses
toward switches (hits) and
percentage of correctly
withheld responses toward
drifts (correct rejections, CR).
(B) Beta values signifying the
relationship between error rate
on switches and drifts and
switch and drift surprise I(x).
Switch surprise was positively
correlated with correct
responses; a lower drift
surprise, (i.e., anticipation of
drifts) was accompanied by a lower error rate.
Figure 3. fMRI main effects
at p < .05, whole-brain
TFCE-corrected. (A) There
was statistically significantly
increased activation during
switches in medial prefrontal
and cingulate areas and in
the right hippocampus.
(B) Drifts elicited significant
activation of BA 6 extending
into IFG and anterior insula.
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Parameter estimates of right caudate activity significantly
correlated with Pr (r = .536, p = .007, one-tailed) but not
with Br index (r = .275, p = .121, one-tailed) at an ad-
justed alpha level of .025. Left caudate activity was not
related to either of the two measures (Pr: r = .33, p =
.075, one-tailed; Br: r = .24, p = .153, one-tailed; Fig-
ure 4). This correlation of striatal activation with Pr value
suggests that prediction error processing in the striatum
is associated with the ability to make the correct re-
sponse toward surprising stimuli. This finding stands in
contrast to the proposal that the striatum is limited to sig-
naling any deviation from predictions per se.
SN Activity Reflects Adaptation of Flexible and Stable
State Transitions
The epoch-based analysis revealed that activity in the left
SN (x = −12, y = −21, z = −18) significantly correlated
Table 1. fMRI Activations
Region Side BA Cluster Size
MNI Coordinates
pax y z
Switch > Drift
Superior frontal gyrus L 9 432 −21 57 33 10−4
Anterior cingulate cortex L 10 67986 −6 48 0 10−3
Postcentral gyrusb R 3 65745 21 −36 63 10−3
Cuneus R 18 3024 −6 −93 27 10−3
Inferior temporal gyrus R 20 135 54 −27 −24 10−2
Drift > Switch
Frontal inferior gyrus R 48 1377 39 12 23 10−4
Supplementary motor area R/L 32 79002 0 15 48 10−3
Supramarginal gyrus R 40 999 54 −33 42 10−3
Premotor cortex L 6 81 −15 3 75 10−2
Inferior parietal lobule L 21 540 −48 −36 42 10−2
Inferior temporal gyrus R 20 189 51 −48 −15 10−2
Angular gyrus R 7 621 30 −57 45 10−2
R = right; L = left; x, y, z = MNI coordinates of peak voxel activation.
aTFCE-corrected for multiple comparison.
bExtending into bilateral posterior cingulate cortex and right hippocampus.
Figure 4. Results of caudate
ROI analysis, reported at
p < .05, TFCE-SVE-corrected.
In the caudate ROIs, there
was higher activation for both
switches and drifts compared
with standard digits. Activation
during these critical events
scaled with participants’ ability
to discriminate between
events as indicated by
behavioral Pr index.
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(at p < .05, TFCE-SVC-corrected) with a bias toward a
higher miss versus false alarm rate in the previous time
window with an individually fitted length based on levels
of volatility predicting participants’ behavioral perfor-
mance (Figure 5). The whole-brain effect of this analysis
is provided in the Supplementary Material.
This finding suggests that activation of the left SN is
responsible for adapting global thresholds for cognitive
state transitions depending on recent performance his-
tory in response to local environmental demands.
In summary, we show that updating in response to
behaviorally relevant switches and stabilization in face
of irrelevant drifts activated separate cortical networks.
A network consisting of MPFC and hippocampus was
activated by hits at model switches, whereas the require-
ment of model stabilization, that is, correct rejections,
elicited premotor and lateral pFC activation. In contrast,
a prediction error signal in the caudate nucleus corre-
lated with participants’ ability to select the correct re-
sponse. Moreover, reactive state adaptation driven by
either too stable or too flexible behavior in the recent
past was reflected in sustained activity of the dopa-
minergic midbrain.
DISCUSSION
In this study, we could show that different target regions
of dopaminergic projections contribute to separate func-
tions in the processing of unpredicted sensory stimuli.
Specifically, responses to relevant and irrelevant pre-
diction errors requiring either flexible updating or stable
maintenance of internal models, respectively, take place
within different cortical networks, suggesting that both
functions act—at least in part—independent from each
other. Discrimination of prediction errors in terms of
these behavioral requirements rather than a global re-
sponse probability bias was related to striatal activation
increase. Additionally, we found that the dopaminergic
midbrain plays a role in performance-history dependent
transition thresholds between flexible and stable cogni-
tive states. The failure to ignore drifts was accompanied
by decreased SN activity, indicative of decreased DA ac-
tivity; we propose that this activity decrease promotes
transition into a more stable state with a higher emphasis
on ignoring upcoming noise. In contrast, the failure to
flexibly adapt in volatile environments led to increased
SN activity, suggesting transition into a flexible cognitive
state, increasing sensitivity toward changes.
Flexible Updating and Stable Maintenance as
Functionally Independent Processes
To date, there is no clear evidence whether cognitive
flexibility and stability in response to environmental
changes are antagonistically related and depend on one
common neural network or whether they rely on two
separate, that is, neurally distinct and orthogonal mecha-
nisms (e.g., Draheim, Hicks, & Engle, 2016; Hedden &
Gabrieli, 2015; Armbruster, Ueltzhöffer, Basten, & Fiebach,
2012; Müller et al., 2007). This lack of knowledge is partly
due to different operationalization approaches of the
two concepts in terms of different cognitive control sub-
processes (Miyake et al., 2000).
Cognitive stability is commonly measured by working
memory delay tasks rendering representations distractor-
resistant, thus, subsuming processes like active main-
tenance (Baddeley, 1986), shielding (Goschke&Dreisbach,
2008), and cognitive inhibition (Lavie, 2005). Cognitive
flexibility, in contrast, is typically assessed by switching
between different task sets, thus requiring maintenance
and updating of task rule representations, as well as inhibi-
tion of the previously active task set (see Vandierendonck,
Liefooghe, & Verbruggen, 2010, for a discussion). As
Draheim et al. (2016) pointed out, results regarding the
relationship between updating and working memory
capacity furthermore depend on the choice of the depen-
dent variable, that is, accuracy and/or RT.
In the current study, we therefore used a novel task in
which long-term memory rather than working memory
content enabled participants to predict the ongoing
course of a sequence. In case of a violation of the current
internal model, predictions implicated by this error either
had to be stabilized or updated. Thus, in the context of
the current study, cognitive stability refers exclusively to
Figure 5. Parametric effect of
previous error bias on current
epoch-related processing
revealed activation of left SN,
reported at p < .05, TFCE-SVE-
corrected. Schematic diagram
depicts parametric analysis for
two example participants:
BOLD signal change in SN
(reflected in bar color)
depends on the error bias in
the respective previous epoch
(indicated by bar height and
arrow). Bar width illustrates
that epoch lengths were
individually fitted.
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the ability to shield the internal model from temporary
violation, whereas flexibility comprises the ability to up-
date the internal model because of permanent changes.
If flexibility and stability were two extremes on the same
dimension, we would expect that being inflexible leads
to missing relevant events while helping to ignore ir-
relevant changes. At the same time, the ability to detect
relevant events would lead to responses toward irrele-
vant prediction errors. In the present task, participants’
performance could be driven by a set motor response
threshold as shown in a negative correlation between
switch detection and drift rejection. However, we did
not find a corresponding relationship between flexible
and stable responses, thus providing evidence that cog-
nitive flexibility and stability rely on functionally inde-
pendent processes. Because of the limited variability in
our measure of cognitive stability that might have pre-
vented us from finding a significant correlation between
hits at switches and correct rejections of drifts, the find-
ing of a missing relationship needs to be confirmed in
future studies using a similar task.
Different Cortical Substrates of Cognitive
Flexibility and Stability
Our hypothesis that cognitive flexibility and stability rely
on independent processes is substantiated by the differ-
ential processing of switches and drifts on the cortical
level. As hypothesized, we found a network comprising
medial prefrontal regions, that is, BA 9 and BA 10, and
the right hippocampal formation in response to correctly
detected model switches. This suggests that this network
plays a role in the top–down adaptation of working
memory representations by retrieval of an alternative
predictive model from long-term memory. This finding
significantly extends previous studies where mesial BA
9 was found in response to predictable events compared
with destabilized predictions (Kühn & Schubotz, 2012).
More rostral portions of the MPFC have been implicated
in guiding hippocampal encoding and retrieval when
new information is integrated into existing knowledge
(Schlichting & Preston, 2015; Preston & Eichenbaum,
2013; van Kesteren, Ruiter, Fernández, & Henson, 2012).
Our findings suggest that this network provides top–down
predictions, which initiate an immediate update of cur-
rently valid internal models.
We further hypothesized drift-specific activation of
lateral pFC, which would reflect model stabilization
(D’Esposito, 2007; Bilder et al., 2004; Cohen et al.,
2002; Miller & Cohen, 2001). Either dorsal or ventral pre-
frontal portions were expected to be activated, depend-
ing on whether model content was stored visuospatially,
that is, by circular sequence representation, or phono-
logically (see Rottschy et al., 2012, for a meta-analysis).
Furthermore, previous studies have shown that the pre-
diction of sequences primarily activates premotor and not
necessarily prefrontal regions (Schubotz, 2007; Schubotz
& von Cramon, 2003). Even increasing the demand on
mnemonic representation of the sequence by occluding
some of its stimuli did not recruit prefrontal areas but
rather further boosted premotor activity (Schönberger,
Hagelweide, Pelzer, Fink, & Schubotz, 2015). Thus, we
expected the premotor network to be activated in re-
sponse to irrelevant prediction errors. In line with our
hypotheses, we observed that mental sequence com-
pletion and stabilization in case of drifts activated a net-
work comprising SMA, premotor cortex, and portions of
the IFG extending along the operculum into anterior
insula. Because the common task strategy was sub-
vocalization of the digit sequence, activation of IFG pre-
sumably reflects heightened verbal working memory load
because of sequential interruptions (Fegen, Buchsbaum,
& D’Esposito 2015; Shergill et al., 2002). Our results thus
further substantiate that a network comprising not only
lateral prefrontal but also premotor regions plays a basic
role in the stabilization of predictive internal models that
are stored in working memory.
Recognition of Prediction Error Types in
the Striatum
Although the behavioral consequences of different types
of prediction errors requiring updating or shielding of
predictions are processed in different neural networks,
our study further provides evidence that all types of sur-
prising events are captured by the same (pre-) attention
control system, presumably gated through the striatum.
A number of recent studies suggest that the striatum is
responsible for flexible updating and adaptation of corti-
cal representations (e.g., Stelzel, Fiebach, Cools, Tafazoli,
& D’Esposito, 2013; Cools et al., 2007; Dreisbach &
Goschke, 2004). Moreover, there is evidence for a basic
stimulus selection function of the striatumwhen faced with
unpredicted sensory input (e.g., den Ouden, Danizeau,
Roiser, Friston, & Stephan, 2010; Corlett et al., 2004;
O’Doherty et al., 2004; Seymour et al., 2004).
In this study, we observed that caudate activity is related
to selecting the correct response following prediction
errors rather than being driven by a global response prob-
ability bias. This suggests that specific behavioral impli-
cations of both event types have been or are recognized
at this processing stage. This novel finding extends the
proposed input gating function to control cognitive and
motor representations in the pFC (Chatham & Badre,
2015; Badre, 2012; Cools, 2011). Our data thus integrate
the above-mentioned findings, suggesting that flexible
stimulus processing in the striatum might comprise a se-
lection process, which can entail adaptation, stabilization,
or building of internal models.
Adaptation of Flexible and Stable States in the SN
Our results support the hypothesis that activity in the
SN is associated with the transition between states of
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cognitive flexibility and cognitive stability, driven by
participants’ performance in response to recent environ-
mental demands. This finding delivers evidence in favor
of recent computational models (Durstewitz & Seamans,
2008), which propose a dopaminergic modulation of
cognitive states: A D1 receptor dominated state is asso-
ciated with active maintenance, whereas DA action on
D2 receptors promotes flexibility of the system. Further-
more, it has been proposed that tonic DA release balances
transitions between different states by modulating the
degree to which prior learning biases action selection
(Humphries et al. 2012). The adjustment of each of the
two states might thus be realized by presynaptic effects
of tonic DA release: DA released in this manner acts as
an inhibitory feedback signal and changes responsivity
of the DA system in such a way as phasic responses in
the dopaminergic midbrain become curtailed (O’Reilly &
Frank, 2006; Schmitz, Benoit-Marand, Gonon, & Sulzer,
2003; Grace, 1991). Therefore, in this study, we associate
the model of prefrontal function proposed by Durstewitz
et al. (2000) with activation in the midbrain as a source
of dopaminergic activity in pFC. We are the first to show
that the disposition toward (too) stable or (too) flexible
states differs not only between individuals but that
these states also vary intraindividually dependent on the re-
cent performance history in response to environmental
demands.
Conclusion
Taken together, our data provide evidence that flexible
and stable responses in short-term prediction error pro-
cessing correspond to functionally independent functions
but share a common neural substrate in the striatum, re-
sponsible for stimulus discrimination and corresponding
response decisions. MPFC is associated with model update,
whereas lateral pFC stabilizes working memory when faced
with distraction. Furthermore, the adaptation of different
cognitive states, resulting from performance history, is
modulated by SN activation, emphasizing the likely role
of tonic DA in setting a threshold for corresponding state
transitions. Future studies can build on these findings,
especially as they might shed new light on DA-related
diseases, for example, Parkinson disease, in which a
deficient interplay of flexibility and stability may contribute
to the phenotype.
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